Kheibar Shekan missile.
China is helping Houthis, UK investigative report alleges
Note: AI technology was used to generate this article’s audio.
- Investigations allege Chinese firms are the largest source of seized goods for Houthis, supporting them as a counter to the US
- Houthis allegedly use Chinese components, precision tools, and raw materials to locally build parts of Iran's 1,000+ km range Khaibar Shekan missile.
- Report claims Beijing supplies dual-use goods under commercial pretexts to ensure safe Red Sea transit for Chinese ships and allegedly distract US naval forces from the Indo-Pacific.
Chinese enterprises have emerged as the primary source of interdicted materials and illicit goods bound for Houthi-controlled territory in Yemen, according to allegations by UK-based investigative organization Conflict Armament Research and United Nations reports.
The research claims that Beijing is supplying the Iran-backed group with critical dual-use items to exert indirect strategic pressure on the United States.
Among the key developments is a significant effort by the group to manufacture components locally for the Iranian-designed Khaibar Shekan ballistic missile series, systems capable of striking targets at ranges exceeding 1,000 kilometers (620 miles).
Investigators claimed identifying custom-manufactured missile parts, raw materials, testing apparatus, and specialized tooling within recently interdicted shipments, accompanied by documentation identifying Chinese suppliers.
This technological transfer represents a notable leap in Houthi domestic production capabilities -a level of advanced manufacturing possessed by only a small number of nations- and points toward growing operational independence from Iran.
"Dual-use" commercial trade
Despite calling for regional stability and asking Tehran to intervene regarding Red Sea maritime attacks, China supplies the Houthis with dual-use equipment, materials that serve both civilian and military functions.
This mirrors Beijing's strategy in supporting Russia's defense sector, allowing Chinese officials to claim these shipments are standard commercial transactions.
In addition to direct supply lines, Beijing maintains Iran's economic foundation by purchasing sanctioned oil and providing Tehran with drone parts and rocket-fuel precursors, thereby indirectly sustaining Iran's proxy network.
"Chinese support for the Houthis is best understood as a combination of diplomatic protection, selective enforcement, and strategic opportunism," said Mohammad al-Basha, founder of the US-based advisory group Basha Report.
Al-Basha noted that Beijing tolerates the Houthis' use of commercial Chinese artificial intelligence, satellite services linked to state-affiliated firms, and critical dual-use shipments—including precision tools, fertilizer for missile propellants, specialized metallurgy, and drone electronics.
Diverting US naval assets
The Houthis have actively cultivated deeper ties with Beijing, drawing on established Yemeni trading channels in China and selecting members to learn Mandarin to streamline communication.
In return, China has secured guarantees from the Houthis for the unhindered passage of Chinese merchant vessels through the Red Sea—a critical corridor for the world's top exporting economy.
Beyond commercial safety, analysts emphasize that Beijing views the Houthis as a strategic asset in the context of great power rivalry. Should China move to invade Taiwan, the Houthis could threaten major maritime choke points and force the US Navy to divert assets away from the Indo-Pacific theater.
"For Beijing, the Houthis could represent a relatively inexpensive means of exerting indirect pressure on the US and its regional partners without committing Chinese military forces or openly confronting Washington," al-Basha concluded.



