What if Netanyahu wins the election? Palestine’s point of no return
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- A strengthened right-wing, ultranationalist coalition could shift ‘Israel’s’ approach from “conflict management” to “conflict resolution,” aimed at foreclosing Palestinian statehood and entrenching permanent control over the West Bank, Gaza Strip and East Jerusalem.
- The projected trajectory includes accelerated annexation, indefinite military control in Gaza, the weakening of the Palestinian Authority, changes to the status quo at Al-Aqsa Mosque, and a potential shift in Palestinian resistance and international advocacy strategies.
If Benjamin Netanyahu secures an election victory and consolidates a right-wing, ultranationalist coalition, ‘Israel’s’ operational posture toward Palestine could decisively move away from the traditional doctrine of “conflict management.” Instead, it could embrace a comprehensive doctrine of “conflict resolution” designed to foreclose any future Palestinian statehood, entrench permanent direct and indirect control, and fundamentally restructure the political and territorial realities across the West Bank, the Gaza Strip and East Jerusalem.
West Bank: From de facto to de jure annexation
In the West Bank, this governance model would translate into an unprecedented push to transform de facto annexation into de jure annexation. Under the ideological guidance of far-right coalition partners, civil authority over settlement infrastructure would expand, further erasing the boundary between military occupation and domestic civil governance.
The aggressive construction of segregated bypass roads, the establishment of military buffer zones, and the formal legalization of unauthorized settlement outposts would fragment Palestinian population centers into isolated, non-contiguous enclaves.
At the same time, heightened state backing for militant settler elements, coupled with judicial immunity for their actions, could accelerate the coercive displacement of vulnerable rural and Bedouin communities in strategically important areas, particularly the Jordan Valley and the South Hebron Hills. This process would transform the territory into disconnected cantons lacking geographic viability.
Gaza Strip: Indefinite military presence, fragmented governance
In the Gaza Strip, a renewed mandate for Netanyahu would risk institutionalizing an indefinite security perimeter and continued direct military presence.
Rather than permitting the restoration of a unified Palestinian administration, policy would prioritize the maintenance of fortified military corridors, including the Netzarim Corridor and the Philadelphi route. These corridors would physically bisect the Strip while enabling strict monitoring and control of civilian movement.
Humanitarian assistance and future reconstruction would remain heavily conditioned on total demilitarization, effectively stalling large-scale urban recovery and prolonging the destruction of Gaza’s social and economic infrastructure.
By blocking the return of the Palestinian Authority and rejecting sovereign political frameworks, governance could instead be delegated to fragmented local administrative committees or external private contractors. Such an arrangement would risk perpetuating severe socioeconomic distress and creating conditions that incentivize Palestinians to leave the Gaza Strip through gradual, outward migration.
Palestinian Authority: Financial pressure and political dismantling
The institutional target of this trajectory would remain the Palestinian Authority itself, alongside the definitive dismantling of the two-state solution.
Netanyahu’s coalition would likely continue employing financial chokeholds, principally the punitive withholding of clearance tax revenues collected by ‘Israel’ on behalf of the Palestinian Authority, to keep the institution perpetually insolvent and administratively crippled.
Stripped of a credible diplomatic horizon and the capacity to protect its population, the Palestinian Authority would risk being reduced to a hollow municipal administrative contractor, responsible for local affairs and security coordination but completely severed from meaningful political self-determination.
This would formalize the core tenet of the coalition’s far-right political agenda: that no sovereign Palestinian entity should ever be permitted to emerge anywhere between the Jordan River and the Mediterranean Sea.
East Jerusalem: Pressure on Al-Aqsa Mosque, erosion of the status quo
In East Jerusalem and at the holy sites, the existing status quo could face accelerating erosion.
Emboldened right-wing ministers would intensify state support for Jewish prayer at the Al-Aqsa Mosque compound, advancing efforts toward formal temporal and spatial partition of the site while actively undermining the historical Hashemite custodianship.
In surrounding Palestinian neighborhoods, including Sheikh Jarrah and Silwan, targeted evictions, home demolitions and urban engineering projects would proceed at an accelerated pace. These measures would aim to encircle the Old City and disrupt Palestinian demographic continuity across East Jerusalem.
For Palestinian citizens inside ‘Israel’, the same political environment could bring deeper political alienation, intensified surveillance and further legal restrictions targeting civil freedoms and the expression of Palestinian national identity.
Palestinian resistance: A shift toward decentralized mobilization
In response to the systematic closure of institutional political channels, Palestinian resistance could increasingly abandon its traditional reliance on official leadership structures.
On the ground, the resulting political paralysis could fuel decentralized, youth-led armed mobilization across the northern West Bank and refugee camps. These formations would operate entirely outside the command structures of established Palestinian factions, potentially further fragmenting the Palestinian political and security landscape.
International strategy: From statehood negotiations to civil rights
At the broader strategic and diplomatic levels, the permanent disappearance of a viable two-state framework could trigger a profound shift in Palestinian political discourse and civil society activism.
Rather than continuing to prioritize statehood negotiations, Palestinian political actors and civil society organizations could increasingly redirect their efforts toward an international civil-rights struggle focused on dismantling institutional apartheid.
This shift would place greater emphasis on international legal accountability mechanisms, particularly proceedings and other legal avenues involving the International Criminal Court and the International Court of Justice.
The resulting strategy would seek to challenge the institutional structures underpinning permanent Israeli control through international law, legal accountability and sustained global advocacy, rather than relying primarily on diplomatic negotiations to establish a sovereign Palestinian state.



